We present a model of labor markets that accounts for the social network through which agents hear about jobs. We show that an improvement in the wage or employment status of either an agent's direct or indirect contacts leads to an increase in the agent's employment probability and expected wages, in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. A similar effect results from an increase in the network contacts of an agent. In terms of dynamics and patterns, we show that both wages and employment are positively associated (a strong form of correlation) across time and agents. We also analyze the decisions of agents regarding staying in the labor market or dropping out. If there are costs to staying in the labor market, and we compare two networks of agents that are identical except that one group starts with a worse wage status, then that group's drop-out rate will be higher than the other's and there will be a persistent difference in wages between the groups.
Introduction
One of the most extensively studied issues in labor economics is the persistent inequality in wages between whites and blacks. For instance, the gap between white and black males between the ages of twenty and fifty ranges from 25% to 40% depending on education level, and this has varied some over time (see Smith and Welch (1989) for statistics from U.S. census data, broken down across a variety of dimensions and time). 1 It is clear that part of the gap can be explained by differences in factors such as the quality of education and skill levels, but nonetheless, there is still a significant residual that is unexplained (for instance, see Card and Krueger (1992) and Chandra (2000) ). Moreover, once one accounts for the fact that blacks drop out of the labor force at a higher rate than whites, the true gap in wages actually increases (e.g., see Heckman, Lyons, and Todd (2000) ). The idea is that the wages for drop-outs are ignored when comparing only employed workers. The fact that participation in the labor force is different across groups such as whites and blacks is also well-documented. For instance, Card and Krueger (1992) quote drop-out rates for blacks that are 2.5 to 3 times higher for blacks compared to whites (roughly 12 to 13% for blacks compared to 4 to 5% for whites); and Chandra (2000) finds similar sized differences and provides a breakdown of differences in participation rates by education level and other characteristics.
Even if one believes any inequality in wages between social groups to be entirely explainable by differences in factors such as education, skills, and drop-out rates; one is then left to explain why those should differ. 2 The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive theory accounting both for the observed patterns of wages and employment as well as differences in drop-out patterns and their roles in sustaining inequality. We do this by explicitly modeling how social networks are used in the transmission of job information. An analysis of social networks provides a basis for observing both higher drop-out rates in one race versus another and sustained inequality in wages and employment rates even among those remaining in the labor force.
Our model builds upon a well-known stylized fact: a significant fraction of all jobs are found through contacts. While estimates of the percentage of jobs found through social contacts vary across location and profession, they consistently range between 25 and 80% of jobs in a given profession. 3 We take as given that an important source of information about jobs is a social network, and we derive the implications for wage dynamics and drop-out decisions.
More precisely, we model the transmission of job information among individuals by a function that keeps track of who first heard about a job and who (if anyone) eventually ended up getting an offer for that job. The key condition that we impose on this function is that the expected number of offers that a given agent ends up with is nondecreasing in the wage status of other agents. This embodies several things. First, as the status of other agents improves, they have better access to information about jobs. Second, as the status of other agents improves, fewer of the new jobs offer improvements for those agents relative to their current status, and so they are more likely to pass information on. Third, as the status of other agents improves, our given agent becomes relatively "needier". To the extent that agents pay attention to this in passing job information, this would also make it more likely that the given agent hears about jobs.
We emphasize that the reduced form approach we take here, and the parsimony of the assumptions being made, accommodates a large variety of situations, including heterogeneous agents, jobs and wages, repeated and selective passing of information, competing offers for employment, raises due to outside offers, decisions as to whether to switch jobs, etc.
Our model takes such an information transmission network and embeds it into a dynamic setting where we keep track of job turnover. At the beginning of each period, each agent hears of new jobs according through the information transmission network. This results in new job offers to various agents, and possibly results in new wage levels through a well-defined process. Next, at the end of the period, agents randomly lose jobs according to some idiosyncratic breakup probabilities. Wages thus follows a Markov process, with state transitions depending on the information transmission network. Given a discrete wage space, we get an irreducible and aperiodic Markov process with a unique steady-state distribution on wages. We prove that this stationary distribution is strongly associated, that is, the wages of any path-connected agents are positively correlated under the steady-state distribution. 4 We also establish positive correlation of wages for path-connected agents across arbitrary time periods, meaning that, within a given social group, individual wage dynamics are (positively) correlated. These results are quite robust to the details of the actual information transmission protocol being used. The proof is not as easy as one might expect, as there is a countervailing effect that path-connected agents are sometimes in competition for information about certain jobs. This entails some within period negative correlation among the status of certain agents. So we have to prove that in the long run, the long run benefits of improved status of friends-of-friends outweighs the short run competition that they might represent.
In terms of establishing persistent inequality between wages of different types of agents, we need to analyze drop-out decisions. This is clear since the ergodicity of the Markov process governing wages implies that any short-run inequalities may disappear in the long run. However, once we allow agents to decide whether to enter the labor market or to drop out, inequalities between agents persist. We model the entry/drop-out decision as a simultaneous-move game. The decision is made by comparing the discounted expected flow of future wages stemming from entering the labor force with the corresponding discounted costs (such as education costs, opportunity costs, skills maintenance, etc.). Given that individual wages are positively associated across agents, entry decisions in this entry/drop-out game turn out to be strategic complements. Applying the theory of supermodular games, we deduce that two different social groups with identical job information networks but differing in their starting wage and employment profile will have different drop-outs rates that can be strictly ranked. These differences in drop-out patterns in turn breed persistent differences in wages between the two groups. This theory thus highlights the role of collective employment history in persistent wage inequality across social groups. This paper has a companion paper: Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2001) . In that paper we examine a specific case of the model considered here. In particular, we examine a situation where all jobs are identical and there is a single wage level, and job information is passed to at most one agent and only if that agent is unemployed. There we derive positive correlation between the employment of path-connected agents and show that differences in starting conditions can result in different drop-out decisions and persistent inequality in employment. We also provide a number of simulation results illustrating the model in the context of some simple networks. The main contributions here relative to the companion paper are twofold. First, we consider a much more general model both in the passing of job information and in the structure of wages and their relation to job offers. This is not a simple extension, but broadens things in important directions. In fact, it is important to see the results in the more general model because most any application would fit into the broader class examined here rather than the specific case examined in the companion paper. The added features here allow for things such as heterogeneity in jobs, heterogeneity in agents (skills, education, etc.), multiple offers, higher wages due to outside offers, switching of jobs, passing of information to more than one agent, competition between agents for jobs, and repeated passing of information. Second, we study wage dynamics in addition to employment and drop-out decisions. It is very important to derive implications for wages as much of the empirical evidence for inequality relates to wage differences between races, rather than employment. Moreover, we establish a strong form of association of the wages and employment of path-connected agents rather than simple correlation. Hopefully, the network-based labor model developed here can serve as a useful alternative to the competitive models and search models that are traditional to labor economics.
A Model of Networks in Labor Markets
We begin with a formal description of our model.
Wage and Employment Status
The random variable W it keeps track of the wage of agent i at time t. We normalize wages to be 0 if i is unemployed, and more generally W it takes on values in IR + . The vector w t = (w 1t , . . . , w nt ) represents a realization of the wage levels a time t.
From an agent's wage status we can deduce the agent's employment status. Yet, for convenience, we introduce a binary random variable S it that keeps track of the employment status of agent i at time t. We set s it = 1 when i is employed, and s it = 0 otherwise. So, the vector s t ∈ {0, 1} n represents a realization of the employment status at time t. In general (with multiple wage levels), S t is a coarsening of W t .
We follow the convention of representing random variables by capitol letters and realizations by small letters. Thus, the sequence of random variables {W 0 , W 1 , W 2 , . . .} comprises the stochastic process of wage status.
We now discuss how wages and employment evolve over time.
Labor Market Turnover
The labor market we consider is subject to turnover which proceeds repeatedly through two phases as follows.
• In one phase, each currently employed worker i is fired with probability b i ∈ (0, 1), which is referred as the breakup rate.
• In the other phase, agents hear about new jobs. If an agent directly hears about a job vacancy, then he or she either keeps that information or passes the job on to one of their direct connections in the network. Probabilities p ij (w) (as a function of the last period wage status w) keep track of the probability that i first hears about a job and this job ultimately results in an offer for agent j. We discuss these p ij functions in more detail below.
As these phases occur repeatedly over time, it is irrelevant whether we index periods so that first the breakup phase occurs and then the hiring phase occurs, or vice-versa. It turns out to be more convenient to consider the hiring phase first and then the breakup phase. Thus, our convention is that S t and W t are the employment and wage status that occurs at the end of period t. So, in the beginning of period t the status is described by S t−1 , W t−1 . Next, agents hear about jobs, possibly transfer that information, and hiring takes place. This results in a new employment and wage pattern. Then, the breakup phase takes place and the period ends with an employment and wage status S t , W t .
Specifics of Information Transmission
There are many possible variations to consider regarding how information is transmitted and how information affects wages. There are at least three important dimensions that we consider.
One dimension to consider is whether or not an already employed agent can make direct use of information about a new job. In general, jobs have different characteristics and values to different agents. Whenever the new job constitutes an improvement for an already employed agent, this agent switches job, and so the information about the new job is not passed on. 5 However, there may also be a probability that the new information is not valuable to the agent (e.g., the new job is worse than their current position) and so they wish to pass it on. Generally, the higher the current wage of the agent, the higher the probability that the new job will not generate an improving offer and the agent will pass on the information about the job. 5 It might also be that the new job leads the agent's current job to raise its wage to retain the agent.
Another dimension for consideration is to whom an employed agent passes job information. The agent may pass the job information on only to unemployed connections, or may instead select among all of his or her connections in passing on the job information, depending on the current status of their connections. Third, it is also possible that the agent passes the job information to more than one connection, and even that they indirectly pass it on to others, and that a number of agents end up being considered for the job.
In order to capture all of these variations on information passing, we model the job transmission in a general way that allows for a wide range of cases.
The job transmission and offer generation is described by a function p ij :
is the probability that i originally hears about a job and then it is eventually j that ends up with an offer for that job. The case where j = i (that is, p ii (W t−1 )) represents the situation where i hears about a job and is the one who eventually gets an offer for the job.
As emphasized above, the function p ij is a reduced form that can accommodate a very large variety of situations. All that is important for our analysis is to keep track of who first heard about a job and who (if anyone) eventually ended up getting an offer for the job. In the interim it might be that agents keep any job information they hear about or it may be that they pass the information on. When passing information, agents may pass it to just one connection at a time or they may tell several connections about the job. These connections might also pass the information on to others, and it could be that several agents end up in competition for the job. And of course, all of this can depend on the current state w. Regardless of this process, we simply characterize the end result through a probability that any given agent j ends up with an offer for a job that was first heard about by agent i.
For simplicity, we assume that in a given period a given agent hears about at most one job directly. This is purely a simplifying assumption, and it is quite clear that it is inconsequential in any of the proofs. And it is still possible that an agent ends up hearing about several jobs, some of which are heard of indirectly.
Assumptions on the reduced form
Let p i (w) = j p ji (w). So, p i (w) represent the expected number of offers that i will get depending on the wage state in the last period being w. Implicit in this is the assumption that the realizations under p ji (w) and p ki (w) are independent. Note that this is very different from the realizations under p ij and p ik , which will generally be negatively correlated. So we are just assuming that j and k do not coordinate on whether they pass i a job. We could allow agents to coordinate on whom they pass information to. This would complicate the proofs in the paper, but would not alter the qualitative conclusions. In fact, as we let the periods become small, the probability that more than one job appears in a given period will go to zero in any case, and so it will be clear that the results extend readily.
We let p denote the vector of functions across i and j. Let w denote the maximum value in the range of wages. The functions p ij are assumed to satisfy the following conditions for any w in the range of wages:
(1) p i (w) is nondecreasing in w −i and nonincreasing in w i , and (2) p i (w) > 0 for any w and i such that w i < w i (3) if p i (w) > p i (w −j , w j ) for j = i, then p i is increasing in w j whenever w i < w i .
(1) imposes two requirements. The first is that the expected number of jobs that i hears about is weakly increasing in the wages of agents other than i. This encompasses the idea that other agents are (weakly) more likely to directly or indirectly pass information on that will reach i if they are more satisfied with their own position, and also that they might have better access to such information as their situation improves. It also encompasses the idea that other agents are (weakly) less likely to compete with i for an offer if they are more satisfied with their own position. The second requirement is similar but keeps track of i's wage. Note that this allows for i to be more likely to directly hear about a job as i's situation worsens (allowing for a greater search intensity). 6 We remark that (1) is not in contradiction with the fact that some agents might be more qualified than other agents for a given job. Such qualifications can be completely built into the agents' identities i, j, etc., which are accounted for in the p ij 's. Condition (1) only describes how changes in agents' current circumstances affect job transmission.
(2) simply requires that if an agent is not at their highest wage level, then there is some probability that they will obtain an offer. This is clearly satisfied as long as there is some probability that they directly obtain an offer, and is a very weak requirement.
(3) is a simplifying assumption. This guarantees that if i's probability of hearing about a job is sometimes sensitive to j's status, then it is sensitive to j's status whenever i is not at the highest wage level. This simply allows us to make statements about positive correlations that do not need to be conditioned on particular circumstances. Without this assumption, some strict inequalities simply become weak ones in some special cases.
Let us briefly describe a few examples that fit into our model.
Example 1 Homogeneous jobs and agents connected by a graph.
This is the situation considered in Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2001). The network of connections among agents is described by a non-directed graph g, which is an n × n symmetric matrix, that is g ij = g ji . If g ij = 1 then i is linked to j and g ij = 0 if i is not linked to j. The interpretation is that if g ij = 1, then when i hears about a job opening, i may tell j about the job. The symmetry of the network means that the acquaintance relationship is a reciprocal one: if i knows j, then j knows i.
In this example jobs are all identical (e.g., unskilled labor) and wages depend only on whether a worker is employed or not. At the beginning of each period, agent i hears of some available job slot with probability a ∈ (0, 1). The passing of information is as follows. When i hears of a job and is unemployed, then i takes the job. If i is employed, then he randomly picks an unemployed (direct) acquaintance and passes the information along. If all direct acquaintances are employed, then the information is lost.
and s j = 0, and 0 otherwise.
Example 2 Heterogeneous Agents.
Consider the above example with some variations. The arrival rate a is specific to agents and so is denoted a i . In addition, the network relationships may be weighted and asymmetric, so that the g ij 's are not necessarily in {0, 1}.
Here p ij (s) is as follows: Example 3 Relaying information.
Consider a variation on Example 2 where we now allow agents to relay information in the case that all of their acquaintances are employed. For instance, if all of i's direct acquaintances are employed, then he passes the information randomly to one of them, who then picks an unemployed direct acquaintance randomly (if one exists) and relays the information to her. Otherwise the job information is lost.
Here p ij (s) is as follows:
, and s j = 0; and 0 otherwise.
Example 4 Heterogeneous jobs
Again, consider Example 2, but now where jobs are heterogeneous and wages may take on different values. Denote by w i the highest wage attainable by agent i. At the beginning of each period, agent i hears about a job opening offering a wage w i with probability a w i i ∈ (0, 1). If i directly hears about a new job that pays a higher wage than i's current job position, then agent i keeps that information. 7 If the new job does not offer any improvement, then agent i randomly passes the information on to one of his direct acquaintances who currently has a wage lower than that of the new job, with weights reflecting the relative link intensities.
Here p ij (w) is as follows (now needing to be written as a function of the vector of beginning wages w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) rather than just the vector of employment s):
if w i > w j and g ij = 0; and 0 otherwise.
These are just a few examples to give some idea of the kinds of things admitted. As should be clear from the conditions on the p i 's, one can also include things like passing information to several agents at once (the p ij 's then represent the chance that an agent obtains an offer when competing with whomever else has also heard about a given job), multiple relays of information, situations where the weights depend on agents' current wages, situations where the arrival rates of job information (e.g., a w i i in Example 4) depend on the current state of wages,...
2.4
The Determination of Offers, Wages, and Employment
Determination of Offers
The above described process leads to a number of new job opportunities that each agent ends up at the end of the hiring process. Let O it be the random variable denoting the number of new opportunities that i has in hand at the end of the hiring process at time t. Given W t−1 = w, the distribution of O t is governed by the realizations of the p ij (w)'s. 8 
Determination of Employment
As before, the labor market we consider is subject to turnover which proceeds repeatedly through two phases: first, the breakup phase where each agent i loses job with probability b i , then, the hiring phase where agent i gets offers. The employment status then evolves as follows. If agent i was employed at the end of time t − 1, so S i,t−1 = 1, then the agent remains employed (S it = 1) with probability (1 − b i ) and becomes unemployed (S it = 0) with probability b i . If agent i was unemployed at the end of time t − 1, so S i,t−1 = 0, then the agent becomes employed (S it = 1) with probability (1 − b i ) conditional on O it > 0, and otherwise the agent stays unemployed (S it = 0).
Determination of Wages
The evolution of wages is as follows. The function w i : IR + × {0, 1, 2, . . .} → IR + describes the wage that i obtains as a function of i's previous wage and the number of new job opportunities that i ends up with at the end of the hiring phase. This function is increasing in past wages and
8 So the number of job opportunities that some agent j ends up with, Ojt, is the sum of binomial random variables.
These binomial random variables are that some agent i originally heard about a job and that information ended up in j's hands, which from our definitions has probability pij(wt) of occuring.
There may still be a loss of wages, but this occurs during the breakup phase when an agent becomes unemployed. It is also assumed that w i (W i,t−1 , O it ) is nondecreasing in the number of new offers received, O it , and that w i (0, 1) > 0 so that a new job brings a positive wage. In general, the wage might be effectively increasing in the number of offers an agent for at least two different reasons. First, the best match of a larger set of offers is likely to be better; second, if an agent has several potential employers then competition between them will bid the wage up. 9 We emphasize that this is not at all in contradiction with the previous assumptions on the p ij 's. Wages are increasing in the offers that an agent eventually obtains, which can be thought of as the "viable" offers. An agent might hear about a job that is a poor match for him or her (e.g., their current location or position dominates the new job) and would never lead to a viable offer. It is then perfectly rational for the agent to pass the job information on to other agents, as might happen under the p ij 's. The important distinction is that the offers (O it 's) that are kept track of in the model are only the viable ones.
For simplicity in what follows, we assume that w i takes on a finite set of values and that these fall in simple steps so that if w ′ > w are adjacent elements of the range of w i , then w ′ i = w i (w, 1). This means that wages are delineated so that an agent may reach the next higher wage level with one offer. We assume that the highest wage an agent may obtain is above 0, that is w i > 0. We also assume that w i (w ′ , o) ≥ w i (w, o + 1) for any o and w ′ and w such that w ′ i > w i . This simply says that having a higher wage status is at least as good as having one additional offer (at least in expectations).
The wage of an agent then evolves according to the following
Multiplying the expression by S it keeps track of whether i loses his or her job during the breakup phase.
Networks
In Examples 1 to 4, the network of relationships among individuals is modeled as a graph and the p function is determined by geometry of the graph. In general, the agents' interrelationships may be quite complicated and more easily described by the p function than any graph. Nevertheless it will still be useful for us to keep track of some "connection" relationships. In particular, it is helpful to keep track of agents i and j for which p i (w) is sensitive to changes in w j for some w.
We will say that i is connected with j if p i (w) = p i (w −j , w j ) for some w and w j .
Let us emphasize that the term "connected" does not necessarily mean that i and j pass information to each other. It might be that p ij (w) = p ji (w) = 0 for all w, and yet still p i (w) is sensitive to w j . This would happen if p ki (w) depended on w j , and hence the connection might be "indirect". In words, two agents who are connected need not pass each other information; it is just that their statuses directly or indirectly affect each other's probability of hearing about a job. 10 Let
It is natural to focus on situations where connection relationships are at least minimally reciprocal, so that i ∈ N j (p) if and only if j ∈ N i (p). We maintain this assumption in what follows. In the absence of such an assumption, some of the statements in the results that follow need to be more carefully qualified. Generally, all of the nonnegative correlation results will still hold. However, for strictly positive correlations to ensue, it must be that information can have implications that travel sufficiently through the network to have one agent's status affect another, and so the definition of path connected would need to be carefully modified to account for directed paths.
We can also keep track of further levels of this "connection" relationship. Let
N n i (p) then captures all of paths generated by the indirect connection relationships of an agent i. We say that i and j are path connected if j ∈ N n (p).
The sets N n i (p) partition the set of agents, so that all the agents in any element of the partition are path connected to each other. We denote that partition by Π(p).
We assume that any π ∈ Π(p) contains at least two agents. Thus each agent is connected with at least one other agent. Completely isolated agents have dynamics of wages and employment that are trivial, and so we restrict our attention to non-isolated agents for whom network relationships matter.
An Economy
Given an initial distribution over states µ 0 and a specification of N , p i 's, and b i 's, the stochastic process of employment {S 1 , S 2 , . . .} and wages {W 1 , W 2 , . . .} is completely specified. We refer to the specification of (N, p, b) satisfying the properties that we have outlined as an economy. We discuss the dependence on the initial distributions over states when necessary.
We remark that keeping track of employment status is redundant given wages, but it is still useful to distinguish these in the discussion below.
Useful Observations Regarding Wage and Employment Distributions
We begin our analysis with two straightforward results that present intuitive observations regarding employment and wage status. These are useful later on.
10 Note also that this definition can also have pij > 0, but i and j not be "connected" (if pi does not depend on wj). This is merely an issue of semantics, as for our results it is important how changes in one agent's status affect another, and hence our definition of connected.
The following lemmas describe the Markov process governing the evolution of employment and wages as it depends on two features: the current state of the process (w t ) and the transition probabilities (p ij 's). (N, p, b) , time t > 0, two wage states w ∈ IR n + and w ′ ∈ IR n + and an agent i who is unemployed in both states (w i = w ′ i = 0). If w ′ j ≥ w j for all j ∈ N 2 i , then the distribution of i's employment, offers, and wages (S it , O it , and W it ) conditional on W t−1 = w ′ first order stochastically dominate the corresponding distributions conditional on W t−1 = w. If p i (w ′ ) = p i (w), then the first order stochastic dominance is strict.
Lemma 1 Consider any economy
Lemma 1 says that improving the wage status of any of an agent's connections leads to an increase (in the sense of stochastic dominance) in the probability that the agent will be employed and the agent's expected wages. The proof of Lemma 1 follows from the fact that for any i and j the function p ji is nondecreasing in w k for k = i (condition (2)). The proof appears in the appendix.
We offer a parallel result where the state is fixed but the network (p ij 's) improves.
Fix an economy (N, p, b) and consider an alternative social structure p ′ . We say that p ′ one-
We refer to the above as "one-period domination" since i's perceived status will improve for the next period under p ′ compared to p. However, since p ′ and p might differ beyond i's connections, the long run comparison between p and p ′ might differ from the one period comparison. In Example 4, this one period domination condition is satisfied at w for some i if w i < w i implies that, for each k, g ′ ki ≥ g ki and g kj ≥ g ′ kj for each j = i such that w j < w j .
Lemma 2 Consider an economy (N, p, b) and an alternative social structure p ′ that one-period dominates p at w ∈ IR n + from some agent i's perspective. The distributions of i's employment, offers and wages (S it , O it and W it ) conditional on W t−1 = w under p ′ first order stochastically dominate the corresponding distributions under p. If p ′ i (w) = p i (w), and w i < w i , then the first order stochastic dominance is strict.
Lemma 2 states that an agent's probability of being employed, expected number of offers and wages all go up (in the sense of stochastic dominance) if the agent's probability of hearing job information through the network improves. Again, the straightforward proof appears in the appendix.
Next, we turn to understanding the dynamics and patterns in both employment and wages, as we look across agents and/or across time.
The Dynamics and Patterns of Wage and Employment
We begin with patterns of wages as the results on employment have an added complication that we will discuss shortly.
Wage Patterns and Dynamics
Before stating a theorem on wage patterns, let us discuss an issue that arises that we need to address.
Consider a situation where agents are more likely to pass job information on to direct connections with lower wages than to direct connections with higher wages, as in Example 4. In such a situation, an agent who has a low wage, but whose wage is still higher than some other agents who are competitors for information about a job, might end up with a next period expected wage that is lower than what they would expect if they quit their job. This can happen because if they were to quit their job, their direct connections would be more likely to pass information to them, and they might have a positive probability of obtaining several offers at once.
While this might be an unusual case, it is one that we have not precluded under the assumptions on p. This difficulty is overcome when we look at fine enough subdivisions of a period, as then the probability of obtaining more than one offer becomes negligible compared to the probability of obtaining one offer, provided the probability of obtaining at least one offer is not zero, which is assured under (3). This is captured in the following definition.
T -period Subvidisions
A natural way to analyze shortened periods is simply by dividing p and b by some T . 11 More formally, starting from some economy (N, p, b), the T -period subdivision, denoted (N,
T for each i and j. T -period subdivisions are also the natural way to sort out the short run competition from the longer run benefits of indirect connections. As the periods shorten, the competitive effects become outweighed by the longer run benefits. Again, this is the natural approximation of the underlying Poisson arrival process.
Association
While first order stochastic dominance is well suited for capturing distributions over a single agent's status, we need a richer tool for discussing interrelationships between a number of agents at once. There is a generalization of first order stochastic dominance relationships that applies to random vectors, that was introduced into the statistics literature by Esary, Proschan, and Walkup (1967) under the definition of association.
A probability measure µ describing a random vector (say W defined on IR n ) is associated if
for all pairs of non-decreasing functions f : IR n → IR and g : IR n → IR, where Cov(f, g) is the covariance
Association tells us that good news about the state (conditioning on g(w) ≥ d) leads us to higher beliefs about the state in the sense of domination. If W 1 , . . . , W n are the random variables described by an associated measure µ, then we say that W 1 , . . . , W n are associated. Note that independent random variables are associated by definition.
Note that if W is a random vector described by a measure µ, then association of µ implies that W i and W j are non-negatively correlated for any i and j. Essentially, association is a way of saying that all dimensions of W are non-negatively interrelated. If W were just a two dimensional vector (e.g., there were just two agents), then this would reduce to saying that there was non-negative correlation between the agents' wage levels. The definition captures more general interactions between many agents, and says that good news in the sense of higher values of W i , i ∈ {i 1 , . . . , i ℓ } about any subset or combinations of agents (here, {i 1 , . . . , i ℓ }) is good (not bad) news for any other set or combinations of agents. This concept is useful in describing clustering and general forms of positive correlations in employment and wages in what follows.
Strong Association
As we often want to establish strictly positive relationships, and not just non-negative ones, we also define a strong version of association. Since positive correlations can only hold between agents who are path connected, we need to define a version of strong association that respects such a relationship.
Given is a partition Π of {1, . . . , n} that captures which random variables might be positively related.
A probability measure µ describing a random vector on IR n is strongly associated relative to the partition Π if it is associated, and for any π ∈ Π and nondecreasing functions f and g
whenever there exist i and j such that f is increasing in w i for all w −i , g is increasing in w j for all w −j , and i and j are path connected under Π.
Strong association captures the idea that better information about any of the dimensions in π leads to unabashedly higher expectations regarding every other dimension in π. One implication of this is that W i and W j are positively correlated for any i and j in π.
We are now ready to state our first theorem. Recall that Π (p) is the partition of the agents so that all the agents in any element of the partition are path connected to each other under p. (N, p, b) . There exists T ′ such that for any T ≥ T ′ , the wages of any path connected agents are positively correlated under the (unique) steady state distribution on wages corresponding to the T -period subdivision of (N, p, b) . Moreover, the limit of the steady state distributions is strongly associated relative to Π(p).
Theorem 1 Consider any economy
The theorem states that any path connected agents have positively correlated wage levels, and in fact exhibit strong association, which is a property that provides for positive interrelationships between all different subgroups. We provide a detailed definition of strong association in the appendix.
We emphasize that the limit of the steady state distributions as T becomes large is a very natural thing to consider, as it is a Poisson birth/death process which would naturally describe the job search. The reason we work with a discrete time approximation is purely for tractability.
The proof of Theorem 1 is long and appears in the appendix. The proof can be broken down into several steps. The first step shows that for large enough T the steady state distribution is approximately the same as one for a process where the realizations of p ij (w) across different j's is independent. Essentially, the idea is that for large enough T , the probability that just one job is heard about overwhelms the probability that more than one job is heard about. This is also true under independence. The proof then uses a characterization of steady state distributions of Markov processes by Freidlin and Wentzel (1984) (as adapted to finite processes by Young (1993) ). We use the characterization to verify that one can simply keep track of the probabilities of just a single job event to get the approximate steady state distribution for large enough T . Next, note that under independence of job hearing, there are no short-run negative conditional correlations. So we can then establish that the conclusions of the theorem are true under the independent process. Finally, we come back to show that the same still holds under the true (dependent) process, for large enough T .
While Theorem 1 provides results on the steady state distribution, we can deduce similar statements about the relationships between wages at different times. (N, p, b) . For fine enough sub-divisions and starting under the steady state distribution, there is a strictly positive relationship between the wage statuses of any path connected agents and at any times. That is, for any any times t and t ′ there exists T ′ such that for any T ≥ T ′ and
Theorem 2 Consider any economy
where i and j are path connected, where Cov T is the covariance associated with the T -period subdivision of (N, p, b) starting at time 0 under the steady state distribution µ T .
Although Theorem 2 is similar to Theorem 1 in its structure, it provides different implications. Theorem 1 addresses the steady state distribution, or the expected long run behavior of the system. Theorem 2 addresses any arbitrary dates in the system. 12 It is important in Theorem 2 that we start from the steady state distribution.
Employment Patterns and Dynamics
One might conjecture (as we initially did) that it would be a simple Corollary to Theorem 1 for employment to exhibit the same positive correlation structure as wages. It turns out to directly follow from the positive correlation (in fact the strong association) of wages that employment is nonnegatively correlated (in fact, weakly associated) across agents. However, positive correlation of wages does not always translate into positive correlation of employment status. That is, it is possible for two agents to have positively correlated wages and yet have their employment status be independent. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 5 Positive Correlation of Wages but Independence of Employment.
Let agent i's wages take on three values {0, 1, 2} and agent j's wages take on two values {0, 1}. Let i and j be path connected (but say not connected). 13 Consider a limiting steady state distribution which has the following marginal distribution on W i and W j : Under this marginal distribution, W i and W j are positively correlated. That is easily checked from the above table. Note, however, that S i and S j are independent. That is easily seen since the above distribution reduces to the following distribution on employment: This type of distribution cannot arise if p is a function of S rather than of W . Thus, with this added condition we can establish positive correlation in employment.
Theorem 3 Consider any economy (N, p, b).
• There exists T ′ such that for any T ≥ T ′ the employment of any connected agents is positively correlated under the (unique) steady state distribution on employment corresponding to the T -period subdivision of (N, p, b).
• The limit (as the subdivisions become finer) of the (unique) steady state distributions on employment status is associated. 14 13 That is, i and j wage statuses do not influence each other, but i and j are connected through a chain of agents whose wages statuses do influence each other.
14 Having fixed an initial state W0, an economy induces a Markov chain on the state Wt. Note that this does not correspond to a Markov chain on the state St, as the probability of transitions from St to St+1 can still depend on Wt (rather than just St) and hence on t for a given starting distribution. Nevertheless, as the wage states do form a Markov chain, there is a steady state distribution induced on the wage state W . As S is a coarsening of W , there is a corresponding steady state distribution on S.
• If p can be written as a function of S, 15 then the limit of the (unique) steady state distributions on employment is strongly associated relative to Π(p). Thus, exists T ′ such that for any T ≥ T ′ the employment of any path-connected agents is positively correlated under the (unique) steady state distribution on employment corresponding to the T -period subdivision of (N, p, b).
Theorem 3 establishes the positive interrelationships between the employment of any collections of path connected agents under the steady state distribution.
The role of the assumption that p is dependent only on S is important in establishing the strong association of employment of agents who are path connected (rather than connected), as was shown in Example 5.
We also have an analog of Theorem 2, stating that the positive interrelationships between employment statuses hold both under the steady distribution and at any time along the dynamics. (N, p, b) such that p is a function of employment status. 16 For fine enough sub-divisions and starting under the steady state distribution, there is a strictly positive relationship between the employment statuses of any path connected agents and at any times. That is, for any times t and t ′ there exists T ′ such that for any
Theorem 4 Consider any economy
for any path connected i and j, where Cov T is the covariance associated with the T -period subdivision of (N, p, b) starting at time 0 under the steady state distribution µ T .
Dropping Out and Long-Run Inequality
Consider the following game endogenizing the network structure. Let d i ∈ {0, 1} denote i's decision of whether to stay in the labor market. Each agent discounts future wages at a rate 0 < δ i < 1 and pays an expected discounted cost c i ≥ 0 to stay in. Agents dropping out get a payoff of zero. An augmented economy is a specification (N, p, b, c, δ) , where c is a vector of costs and δ is a vector of discount rates.
When an agent i exits the labor force, we reset the p's so that p ij (w) = p ji (w) = 0 for all j and w, but do not alter the other p kj 's. The agent who drops out has his or her wage set to zero. 17 Therefore, when an agent drops out, it is as if the agent disappeared from the economy.
Fix an augmented economy (N, p, b, c, δ) and a starting state W 0 = w. A vector of decisions d is an equilibrium if for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, d i = 1 implies
and d i = 0 implies the reverse inequality.
The "drop-out" game is supermodular (see Topkis (1979) ) which leads to the following lemma. (N, p, b) , state W 0 = w, and vector of costs c ∈ IR n + . There exists T ′ such that for any T -period subdivision of the economy (T ≥ T ′ ), there is a unique equilibrium d * (w) such that d * (w) ≥ d for any other equilibrium d.
Lemma 3 Consider any economy
We refer to the equilibrium d * (w) in Lemma 3 as the maximal equilibrium.
Theorem 5 Consider any augmented economy (N, p, b, c, δ) . Consider two starting wages states, w ′ ≥ w with w = w ′ . There exists T ′ such that the set of drop-outs under the maximal equilibrium following w ′ is a subset of that under w that for any T -period subdivision (T ≥ T ′ ); and for some specifications of the costs and discount rates the inclusion is strict. Moreover, if d * (w) i = d * (w ′ ) i = 1, then the distributions of i's wages and employment W it and S it for any t under the maximal equilibrium following w ′ first order stochastic dominate those under the maximal equilibrium following w, with strict dominance for large enough t if d * (w) j = d * (w ′ ) j for any j who is path connected to i. In fact for any increasing f : IR n + → IR and any t
with strict inequality for some specifications of c and δ.
Theorem 5 shows how persistent inequality can arise between two otherwise similar groups with different initial employment conditions.
Appendix
Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2: We prove the statements for the distribution of O it . The first order stochastic dominance statements for W it and S it then follow easily, since W it is simply w(0, O it ) with probability 1−b i and 0 with probability b i , and similarly S it = 1 when O it > 0 with probability 1 − b i , and is 0 otherwise. We remark on the strict first order stochastic dominance for W it and S it at the end of the proof.
Fix some w and p. Consider i such that w i = 0. Fix any agent k = i and consider any
Thus, P k C (w) is the probability that i hears of job offers from each agent in C and none of the agents in N \ (C ∪ k). We can then write the probability that i obtains at least h offers as
Simplifying, we obtain
To establish first order stochastic dominance of a distribution of O it conditional on W t−1 = w ′ over that conditional on W t−1 = w (and/or similarly comparing p ′ and p), we need only show that Prob ({O it ≥ h} | p ′ , W t−1 = w ′ ) is at least as large Prob ({O it ≥ h} | p, W t−1 = w) for each h. Strict dominance follows if there is a strict inequality for any h.
Note that from (1) we can write Prob ({O it ≥ h} | p, W t−1 = w) as a function of the p ki 's, which are in turn functions of w. Since P k C (w) is independent of p ki (w) for any k ∈ N , it follows from equation (1) , that Prob ({O it ≥ h}| p, W t−1 = w), viewed as a function of the p ki 's, is non-decreasing in the p ki 's. Moreover, it is increasing in p ki whenever there is some h such that P k C (w) > 0 for some C ⊂ N \ {k} : |C| = h − 1.
Thus, if p ′ ji (w ′ ) ≥ p ji (w) for each j ∈ N , then we have first order stochastic dominance, and that is strict if the inequality is strict for some k such that there is some h such that P k C (w) > 0 for some C ⊂ N \ {k} : |C| = h − 1. Note that since p ji (w) < 1 for all j ∈ N , it follows that 1 − p ji (w) > 0 for all j ∈ N . This implies that when h = 1, P k C (w) > 0 for C = ∅ corresponding to |C| = h − 1 = 0. Thus, we get strict first order stochastic dominance if we have p ′ ji (w ′ ) ≥ p ji (w) for each j ∈ N with strict inequality for any j. Therefore, any changes which lead all p ji 's to be at least as large (with some strictly larger), will lead to the desired conclusions regarding (strict) first order stochastic dominance.
To establish the strict part of first order stochastic dominance for S it and W it , it is sufficient to conclude first order stochastic dominance and additionally that
As argued above (the case of h = 1), this holds whenever p ′ ji (w ′ ) ≥ p ji (w) for all j with strict inequality for some j; as in the premise of the results.
The following definitions and lemmas are useful in the proof of Theorems 3 and 1. Consider two probability measures µ and ν on a state space that is a subset of IR n . µ dominates ν if
for every non-decreasing function f : IR n → IR. 18 The domination is strict if strict inequality holds for some non-decreasing f .
Domination captures the idea that "higher" realizations of the state are likely under µ than under ν. In the case where n = 1 it reduces to first order stochastic dominance.
Lemma 4 Consider two measures µ and ν on IR n which have supports that are a subset of a finite set W ⊂ IR n . µ dominates ν if and only if there exists a Markov transition function φ :
where φ is a dilation (that is φ ww ′ > 0 implies that w ′ ≥ w). Strict domination holds if φ ww ′ > 0 for some w ′ = w.
Thus, µ is derived from ν by a shifting of mass "upwards" under the partial order ≥ over states w ∈ W .
Proof of Lemma 4:
This follows from Theorem 18.40 in Aliprantis and Border (2000) .
E is the set of subsets of states such that if one state is in the event then all states with at least as high wages (person by person) are also in. Variations of the following useful lemma appear in the statistics literature (e.g., see Section 3.3 in Esary, Proschan and Walkup (1967)). We include a proof of this version for completeness.
Lemma 5 Consider two measures µ and ν on W .
for every E ∈ E, if and only if µ dominates ν. Strict domination holds if and only if the first inequality is strict for at least one E ∈ E. The measure µ is associated if and only if
for every E and E ′ ∈ E. The association is strong (relative to Π) if the inequality is strict whenever E and E ′ are both sensitive to some π ∈ Π. 19 Proof of Lemma 5: First, suppose that for every E ∈ E:
Consider any non-decreasing f . Let the elements in its range be enumerated r 1 , . . . , r K , with r K > r k−1 . . . > r 1 . Let E K = f −1 (r K ). By the non-decreasing assumption on f , it follows that
. It is also clear that E k ∈ E. Note that
Thus,
and
Thus, by (2) it follows that E µ (f (W t )) ≥ E ν (f (W t )) for every non-decreasing f . This implies the dominance. Note that if µ(E) > ν(E) for some E, then we have E µ (I E (W t )) > E ν (I E (W t )), and so strict dominance is implied.
Next let us show the converse. Suppose that µ dominates ν. For any E ∈ E consider f (w) = I E (w) (the indicator function of E). This is a non-decreasing function. Thus, E µ (I E (W t )) ≥ E ν (I E (W t )) and so
To see that strict dominance implies that µ (E) > ν (E) for some E, note that under strict dominance we have some f for which
Since µ(E k ) ≥ ν(E k ) for each E k , this implies that we have strict inequality for some E k . The proof for association (and strong association) is a straightforward extension of the above proof that we leave to the reader (or see Esary, Proschan and Walkup (1967)).
Lemma 6 Let µ be associated and have full (finite) support on values of W . If f is nondecreasing and is increasing in W i for some i, and g is a nondecreasing function which is increasing in W j for some j, and Cov µ (W i , W j ) > 0, then Cov µ (f, g) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 6:
We first prove the following Claim.
Claim 1 Let µ be associated and have finite support. If f is an increasing function of W i which depends only on W i , and g is an increasing function of W j which depends only on W j , and
Proof of Claim 1: We write
where
where I f (s) = 1 if f (W i ) > s, and I f (s) = 0, otherwise. For each s as described above, there exists some s ′ such that I W i (s) = 1 if and only if I f (f (s ′ )) = 1, and similarly for t, g, and t ′ . Therefore, Cov
Given the finite support of W , the sets of such s, t's and corresponding s ′ , t ′ 's are unions of closed intervals with nonempty interiors. By association also we know that Cov µ (I f (f (s)) , I g (g (t))) ≥ 0 for any s, t. Since this expression is positive on a set with positive measure, and everywhere nonnegative, it follows from (3) that Cov µ (f, g) > 0.
Next consider f that is increasing in W i , but might also depend on W −i . Label the possible wage levels of i by w k i where w 1 i = 0 and
, w −i ). By the increasing property of f it follows that γ > 0. Define
It is easily checked that f ′′ is non-decreasing. Similarly define g ′ and g ′′ for g relative to W j . Then
By association, each expression is nonnegative. By Claim 1 the last expression is positive.
Fix the economy (N, p, b). Let P T denote the matrix of transitions between different w's under the T -period subdivision. So P T ww ′ is the probability that
Lemma 7 Consider an economy (N, p, b). Consider w ′ ∈ W and w ∈ W such that w ′ ≥ w, and any t ≥ 1. Then there exists T ′ such that for all T ≥ T ′ and E ∈ E
Moreover, if w ′ = w, then the inequality is strict for at least one E. 20 See, for instance, Corollary B in Section 3.1 of Szekli (1995) . As µ has finite support, these integrals trivially exist.
Proof of Lemma 7: Let us say that two states w ′ and w are adjacent if there exists ℓ such that w ′ −ℓ = w −ℓ and w ′ ℓ > w ℓ take on adjacent values in the range of ℓ's wage function. We show that P
for large enough T and adjacent w and w ′ , as the statement then follows from a chain of comparisons across such w ′ and w. Let ℓ be such that w ′ ℓ > w ℓ . By definition of two adjacent wage vectors,
and similarly P
where P rob T w is the probability conditional on W t−1 = w. Note that by property (1) of p, p ℓj (w ′ ) ≥ p ℓj (w) for all j = ℓ. Also since w ′ k = w k for all k = ℓ property (1) also implies that p ij (w ′ ) ≥ p ij (w) for all j = ℓ and for all i. These inequalities imply that P rob T w ′ (O −ℓ,t ) dominates P rob T w (O −ℓ,t ). It is only ℓ, whose job prospects may have worsened.
Since w ′ ℓ > w ℓ , given our assumption on wages (that w i (w ′ , o) ≥ w i (w, o+1) for any o and w ′ and w such that w ′ i > w i ), it is enough to show that for any a, P rob
. This holds for large enough T , given the independence of different realizations of p jℓ and p iℓ for i = j and property (2) of p, as then the probability of some number of offers is of a higher order than that of a greater number of offers (regardless of the starting state). 21 To see the strict domination, consider E = {w|w ℓ ≥ w ′ ℓ }. Since (for large enough T ) there is a positive probability that ℓ hears 0 offers under w, the inequality is strict.
Given a measure ξ on W , let ξP T denote the measure induced by multiplying the (1 × n) vector ξ by the (n × n) transition matrix P T . This is the distribution over states induced by a starting distribution ξ multiplied by the transition probabilities P T .
Lemma 8 Consider an economy (N, p, b) and two measures µ and ν on W . There exists T ′ such that for all T ≥ T ′ , if µ dominates ν, then µP T dominates νP T . Moreover, if µ strictly dominates ν, then µP T strictly dominates νP T .
Proof of Lemma 8:
[
By Lemma 4 we rewrite this as 21 This holds provided w ′ ℓ < w ℓ , but in the other case, the agent is already at the highest wage state and so the claim is verified.
Step 1: µ * is associated.
Step 2: µ * is strongly associated.
Proof of Step 1:
We show that for any T and any associated µ, µP T is associated. From this, it follows that if we start from an associated µ 0 at time 0 (say an independent distribution), then µ 0 (P T ) k is associated for any k. Since µ T = lim k µ 0 (P T ) k for any µ 0 (as µ T is the steady-state distribution), and association is preserved under (weak) convergence, 26 this implies that µ T is associated for all T . Then again, since association is preserved under (weak) convergence, this implies that lim T µ T = µ * is associated. So, let us now show that for any T and any associated µ, ν = µP T is associated. By Lemma 5, we need to show that ν(EE ′ ) − ν(E)ν(E ′ ) ≥ 0
for any E and E ′ in E. Write
Since W t is independent conditional on W t−1 = w, it is associated. 27 Hence,
Substituting into the previous expression we find that
Under the properties of the p ij 's, both P T wE and P T wE ′ − ν(E ′ ) are non-decreasing functions of w. Thus, since µ is associated, it follows from (8) that
Then since w µ(w) P T wE ′ − ν(E ′ ) = 0 (by the definition of ν), the above inequality implies (7).
Proof of Step 2:
We have already established association. Thus, we need to establish that for any f and g that are increasing in some w i and w j respectively, where i and j are path connected, Cov µ * (f, g) > 0.
By Lemma 6 it suffices to verify that
26 See, for instance, P5 in Section 3.1 of Szekli (1995) . 27 See, for instance, P2 in Section 3.1 of Szekli (1995) .
For any transition matrix P , let P wij = w ′ P ww ′ w ′ i w ′ j , and similarly P wi = w ′ P ww ′ w ′ i . Thus these are the expected values of the product W i W j and the wage W i conditional on starting at w in the previous period, respectively.
Let Cov First let us consider the case where j ∈ N i (p). 28 We know that P wi is increasing in w i , and also, given the assumptions on p, that P wi is increasing ni w j for j ∈ N i (p). Similarly, P wj is increasing in w j . (9) then follows from Lemma 6 (where we apply it to the case where W i = W j ), as both P wi and P wj are increasing in w j .
Next, consider any k ∈ N j (p). Repeating the argument above, since P wj is increasing w j we apply Lemma 6 again to find that W i and W k are positively correlated. Repeating this argument inductively leads to the conclusion that W i and W k are positively correlated for any i and k that are path connected.
The Theorem 1 now follows from Claim 3 since µ T → µ * .
Proof of Theorem 3:
For the case where p depends only on S, the proof is an analog of the proof of Theorem 1. For the more general case, the association of the limiting distribution follows directly from the proof of Theorem 1. The remaining item is to show that in the general case, there is a large enough T so that any two indirectly connected agents have positively correlated employment under the steady state.
Consider i and j ∈ N i (p). We can write S as a function of W . For µ * defined on W , let µ * (s i ) = w:S i (w)=s i µ * (w).
Note that µ * viewed as a measure on S i is associated since µ * viewed as a measure on W is associated, and since S i (w) is non-decreasing (see Esary, Proschan and Walkup (1967)). Next, let E P s i j = w µ * (w|s i )
So, (recalling that S i takes on values in {0, 1}) this is the expected value of S i conditional on the last period S it−1 = s i , under the distribution µ * . Note that under the steady state distribution µ * , for any k
Then, following steps similar to those in Step 2 we can write 29
The remainder of the proof then follows the same lines as that of Theorem 1. E P s i i is clearly increasing in s i . 30 There we need to employ (10) . We note that under association µ * (w|s i ) is 28 If i is such that Ni(p) = ∅, then strong association is trivial. So we treat the case where at least two agents are path connected. 29 We remark that this still holds even though S does not follow a Markov process (past information about W matters and is not fully coded in the current value of S), provided we start from the steady state distribution and given that our definition of E P allows us to transition once. 30 It is essentially 1 − bi when si = 1 and is pi(s) otherwise. Without loss of generality, starting with a large enough T this is increasing.
